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”It’s a Trap”: cDNA Is Patent Eligible! But Is It Patentable?

© 2014 Jeremy McKinney
I. Introduction
On June 13, 2013, the Supreme Court issued a long-awaited decision in Ass'n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. (a.k.a. the Myriad gene patents case). The Court,
in a rare unanimous decision, held that “a naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of
nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, but that cDNA 1 is patent
eligible because it is not naturally occurring.” 2

This ruling upset thirty years of settled

expectations, as inventors and companies have relied on patent protection for their work in gene
isolation. This case note will explore the implications of this ruling on future research, and
innovation in the wake of the Court’s decision.
II. Law Before the Case
Congress, in order “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” was granted the
power to award inventors’ time limited exclusive rights to their inventions in the U.S.

1

cDNA, COLLINS ENG. DICTIONARY, http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/cdna?
(last visited June 17, 2014) (abbreviation for “complementary DNA”) (defined as “a form of
DNA artificially synthesized from a messenger RNA template and used in genetic engineering to
produce gene clones”).
2
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013).

Constitution. 3 To accomplish this, Congress passed the first Patent Act in 1790. 4 This initial act
was followed by several successive acts designed to refine and clarify the original Act, 5 finally
leading to codification of the patent law in 1952 as United States Code Title 35. 6 While it is
similar to and retains the same basic purpose as the original eighteenth century laws, Title 35
serves as the preeminent structure for today's patent law. 7
The patent law seeks to accomplish the goal of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and
useful Arts” 8 by granting temporary monopolies to inventors for their innovations. In exchange
for the monopoly, inventors must release detailed descriptions of their inventions to the public,
written in language that would allow a person of reasonable skill in the art to understand what is

3

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries”).
4
See Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109. The Act authorized patents for “any useful art,
manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known or used”
and provided that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney General
determined that the invention was “sufficiently useful and important.” DONALD S. CHISUM,
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 2 n.12 (1998).
5
See CHISUM, supra note 4, §§ 2-6. The 1790 Act was replaced with the 1793 Act omitting “the
important determination and authorized patents for ‘any useful art, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement [thereon], not known or used before
the application.”’ Id. § 2 (quoting Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318). The Patent Act in
1836 “created a Patent Office and a system of examination of patent applications for compliance
with the requirement of novelty over the prior art.” Id. § 3 (referring to the Act of July 4, 1836,
ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117). The 1870 Act replaced the 1836 Act but retained the essential provisions
and requirements. Id. (referring to the Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198). The 1952 Act,
which was codified as 35 U.S.C., “rearranged existing statutory provisions and stated in statutory
form matters previously recognized only in court decisions and Patent Office practice” and made
several change. Id. § 6.
6
See id. § 6. The 1952 Act “rearranged existing statutory provisions and stated in statutory form
matters previously recognized only in court decisions and Patent Office practice” and made
several changes and additions, including a statutory provision on non-obviousness.
7
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Crafts Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 148 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
in dicta) (observing that “[t]oday's patent statute is remarkably similar to the law as known to
Jefferson in 1793”); CHISUM, supra note 4, § 2 (stating that the 1790 and 1793 patent statutes
contain fundamental concepts that remain the basis of United States patent law today).
8
U.S. CONST. srt. I, § 8, cl. 8.

being claimed. 9 These detailed descriptions are the consideration for the monopoly, given by the
inventor to the public, who then may benefit by the further development of ideas based on the
new technology. 10 The grant of a monopoly and the rights of the public to innovate, require that
patent claims are clear; 11 thus ensuring that the patent owner knows what he owns and the public
knows what he does not. 12 This is part of a delicate balance that the law attempts to maintain
between inventors who rely on the law for protection of their intellectual property to make the
invention known, and the public who are encouraged to pursue innovations, creations, and new
ideas beyond the inventor's exclusive rights. 13
To determine whether a patent claim contains patent-eligible subject matter, courts and
the United States Patent Office (USPTO), rely on 35 U.S.C. § 101. This section outlines the
portal through which all innovation must pass en route to patent recognition. The determination
has been described as a threshold inquiry, which is to be determined as a matter of law in
establishing the validity of the patent. 14 Section 101 places patentable subject matter into four

9

35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); see also Application of Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 593 (C.C.P.A. 1977)
(“[W]e reaffirm our recognition that 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, contains separate
requirements for a written description (1) of the invention, and (2) of the manner and process of
making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled
in the art . . . to make and use the same . . . .”)
10
See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950), (holding that
disclosure of inventions is one of the primary purposes of the patent system).
11
35 U.S.C. § 112.
12
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002); see
also McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891) (holding that requiring the patentee to
particularly point out, and distinctly claim his invention, is “not only to secure to him all to
which he is entitled, but to apprise the public of what is still open to them”).
13
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150-51 (“The federal patent system thus embodies a carefully
crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious
advances in technology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice the invention for a
period of years”).
14
In re Bilski (Bilski I), 545 F.3d 943, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d
1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).

broad categories, including: “new and useful process[es], machine[s], manufacture, or
composition[s] of matter.” 15
However, despite the broad nature of the statutory language, the Supreme Court has
recognized three “fundamental principles” as exceptions to the Patent Act's subject matter
eligibility requirements: “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.” 16 The
Supreme Court has held that “[t]he concepts covered by these exceptions are ‘part of the
storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.’”17
Therefore, “even if an invention appears to claim subject matter that would be statutorily covered
by the Patent Act, it will still be denied patent protection if it falls into one of the ‘fundamental
principles' exceptions.” 18
Although a fundamental principle cannot be patented, the Supreme Court has held that
“an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may
well be deserving of patent protection,” so long as that application would not preempt
substantially all uses of the fundamental principle. 19 In making a preemption determination, the
claim must be considered as a whole, as it is “inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and
new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis.” 20 Nonetheless,

15

35 U.S.C. § 101; see also Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010); Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
16
Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3225.
17
Bilski I, 545 F.3d at 952 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127,
130 (1948)).
18
CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221, 230 (D.D.C. 2011).
19
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981)) (internal
quotations omitted).
20
Id.

a scientific principle cannot be made patentable by simply limiting its use “to a particular
technological environment” or by adding “insignificant post-solution activity.” 21
To determine whether the subject matter of a claim is simply a product of nature, or has
been remodeled into something more, courts have frequently applied the “machine-ortransformation” test. 22 Under this test, claimed subject matter is patent-eligible pursuant to § 101
if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus; or (2) it transforms a particular article into a
different state or thing. 23 The Federal Circuit further explained:
A claimed process involving a fundamental principle that uses a particular
machine or apparatus would not pre-empt uses of the principle that do not also use
the specified machine or apparatus in the manner claimed. And a claimed process
that transforms a particular article to a specified different state or thing by
applying a fundamental principle would not preempt the use of the principle to
transform any other article, to transform the same article but in a manner not
covered by the claim, or to do anything other than transform the specified
article. 24
This test has guided many courts in their gatekeeping function, however, the Supreme Court
recently held that, although the machine or transformation test remains a “useful and important
clue,” it is not the sole test for determining the patent-eligibility of process claims. 25 According
to the Supreme Court, the primary inquiry should instead focus on whether the claimed invention
falls within one of the three fundamental principles exceptions. 26 Expanding on this principle as
the main focus of the case at hand, the Court recognized first that “all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas,”

21

Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191.
Bilski I, 545 F.3d at 954.
23
Id. (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)).
24
Id.
25
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227; see also Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628
F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
26
See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226.
22

and second, “too broad an interpretation of this exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent
law.” 27 The Court began their inquiry by applying “this well-established standard to determine
whether Myriad's patents claim any ‘new and useful . . . composition of matter,’ . . . or instead
claim naturally occurring phenomena.” 28
Since 1982, patents claiming isolated gene sequences have cleared this threshold
inquiry. 29 Although these patents were never fully tested in the crucible of litigation until now,
inventors relied on what they (and their learned counsel) considered the settled expectation of
patent protection for these discoveries when they invested considerable time and treasure in their
pursuit. The work and investment of these erstwhile pioneers have led to many important
discoveries, which have affected not only their fields of research, but many individuals on a very
personal level, through the realization of diagnosis and treatment of disease.
To further bolster the relied upon protection, in 2001, USPTO issued Utility Examination
Guidelines; these guidelines reaffirmed the agency's position that isolated DNA molecules were
patent eligible. 30 In the intervening years, Congress has not indicated that they disagree with the
PTO's position, which has been inferred as (at the very least) tacit approval.

27

Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) (quoting
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)).
28
Id.
29
See Eric J. Rogers, Can You Patent Genes? Yes and No, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
19, 19 & n.3 (2010) (citing patents issued March 30 and December 14, 1982); see also STEPHEN
A. BECKER, PATENT APPLICATIONS HANDBOOK § 4:19 (2010).
30
Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092-1102 (Jan. 5, 2001) (stating that an isolated
and purified DNA molecule that has the same sequence as a naturally occurring gene is eligible
for a patent because (1) an excised gene is eligible for a patent as a composition of matter or as
an article of manufacture because that DNA molecule does not occur in that isolated form in
nature, or (2) synthetic DNA preparations are eligible for patents because their purified state is
different from the naturally occurring compound).

Such was the state of patent law when this case began. Which leaves scholars with the
pressing question: If the law is to be changed in a manner contrary to the settled expectation of
the community of inventors, and inventions claiming isolated DNA as their subject matter
excluded from the broad scope of § 101, should the decision come from Congress or the Court?
III. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.
A. Facts of the Case
This case began with a declaratory judgment action brought to challenge certain claims in
seven patents related to Myriad’s isolation of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, and the correlation
between specific mutations in those genes and a heightened risk of developing certain types of
breast and ovarian cancers. 31 Myriad employed many of the pre-eminent scientists in the field of
genetics and expended vast amounts of time and wealth to isolate the BRCA1 and BRCA2
genes. The question the Court had to answer is whether this renders the genes patentable? 32
Myriad discovered the precise location and sequence of two human genes, BRCA1 and
BRCA2, mutations of which can substantially increase the risks of breast and ovarian cancer.
“The average American woman has a 12- to 13- percent risk of developing breast cancer, but for
women with certain genetic mutations, the risk can range between 50 and 80 percent for breast
cancer and between 20 and 50 percent for ovarian cancer.” 33 The identification and isolation of
the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes allowed Myriad to determine their typical nucleotide sequence. 34
In turn, that information enabled Myriad to develop medical tests that are useful for detecting
31

Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2109.
Id. at 2116.
33
Id.
34
Technically, there is no “typical” gene because nucleotide sequences vary between individuals,
sometimes dramatically. Geneticists refer to the most common variations of genes as “wild
types.”
32

mutations in a patient's BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, thus allowing a physician to assess whether
the patient had an increased risk of cancer.
B. Procedural History
In 2010, Judge Sweet of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
invalidated the challenged claims as patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 35 Myriad appealed
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reversed in a divided decision issued
on July 29, 2011. 36 After the Supreme Court issued their decision in Mayo v. Prometheus, they
granted certiorari, vacated the July 29, 2011 Federal Circuit Myriad decision, and remanded the
case to the Federal Circuit for reconsideration in view of Mayo. 37 Mayo limited the availability
of patents for medical diagnostic techniques claiming a new way to apply the laws of nature,
requiring that these techniques recite more than “routine, [or] conventional activity previously
engaged in by researchers in the field.” 38
The Federal Circuit issued its Myriad remand decision on August 16, 2012, essentially
reiterating their first decision. Judge Lourie, writing for the majority, emphasized the molecular
differences between the claimed sequences and the equivalent DNA existing in human cells,
finding “[i]t is the difference between knowledge of nature and reducing a portion of nature to
concrete form, the latter activity being what the patent laws seek to encourage and protect.” 39 In
her concurring opinion, Judge Moore focused on the function and utility of the isolated DNA
35

Id.
Id.
37
Id.
38
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1302 (2012).
39
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1353 (Fed.
Cir. 2011), reh'g denied (Sept. 13, 2011), reh'g denied (Sept. 16, 2011), cert. granted, judgment
vacated sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794
(2012), and opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App'x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
36

sequences, the settled expectations of the inventing community, and her belief that the judiciary
should defer to Congress on issues where they have acted to determine that the scales had tipped
in the favor of patentability. 40 Contrary, Judge Bryson, in a dissenting opinion., argued that the
DNA molecules, while structurally different, were not materially different from those found in
their native environment, therefore rendering them unpatentable. 41
In light of the circuit court holding, the Supreme Court again granted certiorari,
and heard oral arguments on April 15, 2013. 42
C. The Decision
The Court’s decision focuses on the “product of nature” exception to 35 U.S.C. § 101,
and whether or not the grant of patents on naturally occurring phenomenon would be
counterproductive to the stated reason for issuing patents: to promote creation. 43 The Court’s
concern was that patents on naturally occurring phenomenon, the basic tools of scientific and

40

Id. at 1367 (Moore, J. concurring) (“Congress has, for centuries, authorized an expansive
scope of patentable subject matter. Likewise, the United States Patent Office has allowed patents
on isolated DNA sequences for decades, and, more generally, has allowed patents on purified
natural products for centuries. There are now thousands of patents with claims to isolated DNA,
and some unknown (but certainly large) number of patents to purified natural products or
fragments thereof. . . . I believe we must be particularly wary of expanding the judicial exception
to patentable subject matter where both settled expectations and extensive property rights are
involved. Combined with my belief that we should defer to Congress, these settled expectations
tip the scale in favor of patentability.”).
41
Id. at 1378 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (“The structural differences between the claimed ‘isolated’
genes and the corresponding portion of the native genes are irrelevant to the claim limitations, to
the functioning of the genes, and to their utility in their isolated form.“).
42
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2114 (2013).
43
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).

technological work, would “tie up” the use of such tools and thereby “inhibit future innovation
premised upon them.” 44
1. Naturally Occurring DNA, Even Though Isolated, Is Not Patentable
The Court recognized that Myriad “found an important and useful gene” but then
stipulated that “separating that gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of
invention.” 45 The Court relied heavily on three prior decisions in their holding: Diamond v.
Chakrabarty; Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.; and Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. Each case involved the use or interpretation of a natural
phenomenon, with differing levels of modification or intervention affecting each outcome.
Chakrabarty patented the genetic modification of a bacterium making it “capable of
breaking down multiple components of crude oil.” 46 Funk Brothers Seed Co. distilled six
different Rhizobium bacteria and combined them into a powder form that could inoculate the
seeds of certain legumes, which enabled them “to take nitrogen from the air and fix it in the plant
for conversion to organic nitrogenous compounds.” 47 Finally, Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.
determined the “relationships between concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the
likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause harm.” 48 This
allowed them to define a process by which health care professionals could test their patients in
order to determine the correct dosage without trial and error, thus reducing the risks associated

44

Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.
Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)).
45
Id. at 2117.
46
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305.
47
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 128 (1948).
48
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1296.

with the drug. 49 In each case, a natural phenomenon or process was significantly improved
and/or combined to enhance usability, however, the Court found they were not all patent-eligible.
a) Diamond v. Chakrabarty
In 1972, Ananda Mohan Chakrabarty, working with the General Electric Corporation,
developed a new strain of bacterium that could degrade multiple components of crude oil,
thereby speeding up the process of decomposition. Naturally occurring bacteria that could
accomplish the same process were known, however, no known bacterium was capable of
breaking down multiple components of the crude oil complex.50
For example, at the time of invention, biological control of oil spills required the use of a
mixture of naturally occurring bacteria, each capable of degrading one component of the oil
complex. 51 As part of this degradation process, oil is broken down into simpler substances that
serve as food for aquatic life. However, for various reasons, only a portion of any such mixed
culture survives to attack the oil spill. 52 Conversely, Chakrabarty's micro-organism promised a

49

Id.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305.
51
See id. at 305 n.2; see also U.S. Patent No. 3,813,316 col. 5 ll. 9-16 (filed Jun. 7, 1972).
52
‘316 Patent col. 5 ll. 9-33. Microbial strains are known that can decompose individual
components of crude oil (thus, various yeasts can degrade aliphatic straight-chain hydrocarbons,
but not most of the aromatic and polynuclear hydrocarbons). Pseudomonas and other bacteria
species are known to degrade the aliphatic, aromatic and polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbon
compounds, but, unfortunately any given strain can degrade only a particular component. For
this reason, prior to the instant invention, biological control of oil spills had involved the use of a
mixture of bacterial strains, each capable of degrading a single component of the oil complex on
the theory that the cumulative degradative actions would consume the oil and convert it to cell
mass. This cell mass in turn serves as food for aquatic life. However, since bacterial strains differ
from one another in (a) their rates of growth on the various hydrocarbon components, (b)
nutritional requirements, production of antibiotics or other toxic material, and (c) requisite pH,
temperature and mineral salts, the use of a mixed culture leads to the ultimate survival of but a
portion of the initial collection of bacterial strains. As a result, when a mixed culture of
50

rapid and more efficient oil-spill control by breaking down multiple components of oil with a
much higher survival rate. 53
The Supreme Court held the micro-organism to be patentable, recognizing that what
Chakrabarty produced was a “new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any
found in nature and one having the potential for significant utility.” 54 In the case at hand, the
Court distinguished Myriad by pointing out that Myriad had not created anything. They had
instead merely isolated an existing natural phenomenon. Where Chakrabarty had added plasmids
in order to “create” a new bacterium with greatly improved “capacity for degrading oil,” 55 by
contrast, “Myriad did not create anything. To be sure, it found an important and useful gene, but
separating that gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of invention.” 56
b) Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.
Funk Brothers Seed Co. combined six different naturally occurring rhizobium bacteria
that infect the roots of legumes, enhancing the plant’s ability “to take nitrogen from the air and
fix it in the plant for conversion to organic nitrogenous compounds.” 57 The bacteria occurred
naturally and performed essentially the same function as Mother Nature. 58 However, the
different species of bacteria only combined with specific plants. 59 In addition, when certain
strains came in contact with one another they inhibited the efficacy of each other, greatly

hydrocarbon-degrading bacteria are deposited on an oil spill the bulk of the oil often remains
unattacked for a long period of time (weeks) and is free to spread or sink.
53
Id., at col. 3 l. 5-19.
54
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310.
55
Id. at 305.
56
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013).
57
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 128 (1948).
58
U.S. Patent No. 2,200,532 col. 1 ll. 5-8.
59
Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 129; see also ‘532 Patent col. 2 ll. 31-36.

reducing nitrogen fixation. 60 Funk Brothers Seed Co. determined that there were six strains that
could inoculate many different types of legumes, without exhibiting the mutually inhibitory
behavior. 61 Consequently, Funk Brothers combined the six different types of bacteria packaged
in powder form, allowing farmers to infect the seeds of their varied legume crops without worry
of cross inoculation, which would cancel out the beneficial effects. 62
The focus of Funk Brothers work was not to create a new strain of the bacterium; instead,
their work concentrated on the identification of different bacterium that would not inhibit the
beneficial effects of each other and would inoculate a large number of legume varieties.
Therefore, farmers would be able to purchase one inoculation product, without having to worry
about cross inoculation. This work was ground breaking in the field; however, the Supreme
Court held that it was not patentable. 63 The Court held that they had not created something new,
but had instead mixed what nature had created into a very useful combination. 64
In the instant case, the Supreme Court held that Myriad was analogous to Funk Brothers.
The Court found that Myriad had not created something new; instead, they had taken naturally
60

See Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 129-30 (“[T]he different species of the Rhizobia bacteria produced
an inhibitory effect on each other when mixed in a common base, with the result that their
efficiency was reduced.”)
61
See id. at 130 (“[Funk Brothers] discovered that there are strains of each species of root-nodule
bacteria which do not exert a mutually inhibitive effect on each other. [They] also ascertained
that those mutually non-inhibitive strains can, by certain methods of selection and testing, be
isolated and used in mixed cultures. Thus [they] provided a mixed culture of Rhizobia capable of
inoculating the seeds of plants belonging to several cross-inoculation groups.”)
62
See id.
63
See id. at 131 (Douglas, J) (“[H]owever ingenious the discovery of that natural principle may
have been, the application of it is hardly more than an advance in the packaging of the
inoculants.”).
64
See id. at 132 (“The application of this newly-discovered natural principle to the problem of
packaging of inoculants may well have been an important commercial advance. But once nature's
secret of the non-inhibitive quality of certain strains of the species of Rhizobium was discovered,
the state of the art made the production of a mixed inoculant a simple step. Even though it may
have been the product of skill, it certainly was not the product of invention.”)

occurring phenomenon and distilled them into an admittedly advantageous combination. 65 The
Myriad Court emphasized that “[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does
not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry,” 66 nor does “extensive effort.” 67
3. Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.
Prometheus Labs sued the Mayo Clinic after learning that they had developed testing
procedures that infringed U.S. Patents 6,355,623 and 6,680,302. These patents claimed steps of
testing blood samples that allowed physicians to determine the proper dosage for thiopurine drug
treatment of immune-mediated diseases, such as Crohn’s disease and Ulcerative Colitis. 68 When
ingested, the body converts the thiopurine into therapeutic metabolites that suppress the patient’s
immune system and alleviate symptoms. 69 The patented test provided a means to measure the
level of two such metabolites in the blood: 6-thioguinine and 6-methylmercaptopurine.70
According to the patent, metabolite levels “greater than about 400” and “greater than about
7000” respectively, indicate that an adjustment in drug dosage may be required to avoid toxic
side effects. 71
After purchasing and using the Prometheus test from 1999-2004, the Mayo Clinic
developed their own test utilizing similar methods, however, they used different determinative

65

Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 128.
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117 (2013).
67
Id. at 2118.
68
U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 col. 2 ll. 16-41 (filed Apr. 8, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 6,680,302 col.
2 ll. 18-43 (filed Dec. 27, 2001).
69
‘623 Patent col. 8 ll. 9-20.
70
Id.
71
Id.
66

metabolite levels that they claimed were more effective. 72 Mayo announced their intention to
begin using the test in their clinics, as well as offering it for sale to other potential users. 73
Prometheus then filed suit, and Mayo subsequently rescinded the announced deployment of their
test pending the outcome of litigation. A federal judge for the Southern District of California
granted summary judgment in favor of Mayo. The judgment held that although Mayo was
infringing the patents, the metabolites “6-TG and 6-MMP are products of the natural
metabolizing of thiopurine drugs, and the inventors merely discovered the relationship between
these naturally produced metabolites and therapeutic efficacy and toxicity,” therefore the patents
were invalid and unenforceable. 74
Prometheus appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the
lower court order. 75 The Federal Circuit held that the lower court erred in categorizing the
administrative and determinative steps as data gathering steps. 76 Conversely, the court held that
the administering and determining steps in the patents were part of the treatment regimes for
various diseases using thiopurine drugs. Therefore, the claims were “not drawn merely to
correlations between metabolite levels and toxicity or efficacy.” 77 In addition, the court held that
while mental steps are not normally patentable, the mental steps in the Prometheus Patents were
subsequent steps that made use of the data provided by the prior administering and determining

72

Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., CIV. 04CV1200JAHRBB, 2008 WL
878910 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008) rev'd, 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009) cert. granted, judgment
vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010), rev'd, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012).
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
cert. granted, judgment vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010) (reversing because the district court
erred as a matter of law in finding the asserted claims to be drawn to nonstatutory subject matter)
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steps. 78 Therefore, the “addition of the mental steps to the claimed methods thus does not remove
the prior two steps from that realm.” 79
Mayo appealed to the Supreme Court who granted certiorari and vacated the Federal
Circuit opinion, remanding the case for review in light of Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in
Bilski v. Kappos, which held that a key legal test utilized in the federal circuit decision, the
“machine-or-transformation test,” 80 was not the sole test for deciding whether a process was
patent-eligible. 81 The Federal Circuit once again considered the case and came to the same
conclusion they had previously, emphasizing that the Supreme Court had not invalidated the
machine-or-transformation test, but rather that they had held that it was not the sole test.
Mayo once again appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari, and once again
reversed the Federal Circuit Court decision, holding that the claimed processes were not novel,
but “involve well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously utilized by researchers in
the field.” 82 Further, they held that “upholding the patents would risk disproportionately tying up
the use of the underlying natural laws, inhibiting their use in the making of further
discoveries.” 83 The emphasis on preemption as a reason for invalidation of patent claims is the
key to understanding the importance of the Mayo decision in the current litigation.
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Justice Thomas, in this remarkably restrained opinion, chose not to highlight preemption
as the reason for the Court’s holding. However, the opinion does reveal that the dangers of
preemption were at least part of the Court’s reason for holding the isolated DNA claims invalid.
Citing Mayo, the Court reasoned that without the product of nature exception, “there would be
considerable danger that the grant of patents would ‘tie up’ the use of such tools and thereby
‘inhibit future innovation premised upon them.’” 84
In addition, Justice Thomas, contemplating the possible ways that Myriad could have
couched the discovery in patentable terms, postulated that had Myriad patented the chemical
compound of the gene as a unique molecule instead of the naturally occurring gene sequence,
then a would be infringer “could arguably avoid at least Myriad's patent claims on entire
genes . . . by isolating a DNA sequence that included both the BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene and one
additional nucleotide pair.” 85 This obviously was not the case here, but Justice Thomas’
reasoning illustrated the dangers against which preemption seeks to protect, tying up a natural
phenomenon such that others could not build on the work of the patentee. Or, put another way,
Myriad’s claims monopolized what should be “free to all men and exclusively reserved to
none.” 86
2. Summary of the Court’s Reasoning
The Court was not swayed by Myriad’s argument that similar to the bacterium in
Chakrabarty, Myriad’s “claims are drawn to man-made compositions of matter (or at least man-
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Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013) (quoting
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301).
85
Id. at 2118.
86
Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 130.

made improvements thereof).” 87 The Court literally held quite the opposite when it stated:
“Myriad did not create anything. To be sure, [Myriad] found an important and useful gene, but
separating that gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of invention.” 88
The Court found that Myriad’s isolated DNA claims were analogous to those in Funk
Brothers; they had taken naturally occurring phenomenon and distilled them into an admittedly
advantageous combination. 89 And like the claims in Funk Brothers, the Court invalidated
Myriad’s claims citing the law of nature exception. 90 The Court emphasized that
“[g]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101
inquiry,” 91 nor does “extensive effort.” 92
Finally, the Court made a subtle nod to the proverbial bastard child of patent law:
preemption. While enumerating the reasoning for the long held implicit law of nature exception,
Justice Thomas reasoned that “without [the law of nature] exception, there would be
considerable danger that the grant of patents would ‘tie up’ the use of such tools and thereby
‘inhibit future innovation premised upon them.’ ” 93
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91
Id.
92
Id. at 2118.
93
Id. at 2116 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301
(2012)).

Taken as a whole, the Court leaves us with the fungible guidance that in order to be
patent-eligible natural material must be altered by the inventor “in any way.” 94 The attempts by
the patenting community to define and understand this “in any way” standard, will be hotly
contested, both in and out of courts of law, for years to come.
IV. Impact of the Holding Moving Forward
The decision affects three distinct groups of inventors, in very different ways. These
groups are: those holding current patents which may now claim patent-ineligible matter, those
who have current applications pending with similar claims, and those who are in the various
stages of Research and Development in anticipation of patent filing. The following will be a brief
discussion of the impact on each group.
A. Current Patent Holders
First, the group that will be impacted the most are those who currently hold patents
claiming isolated genes. The claims contained in these patents that cover isolated DNA can now
be invalidated, which will impact the inventors or patent holders in various ways. First, if the
patented material is licensed, the licensees, who will no longer be protected by the patent in their
own endeavors, will look for ways to terminate the license. This could be accomplished utilizing
existing contractual terms, or in some cases, by patent challenges by the licensee themselves who
seek to invalidate the patent claims so they can practice the subject matter free from the
constraints of the license. 95 Second, inventors who practice the inventions claimed in the patents
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Id. at 2117 (summarizing the Funk Brothers holding, “that the composition was not patent
eligible because the patent holder did not alter the bacteria in any way”).
95
Article III of the Constitution requires that a case-or-controversy exist before a suit may be
brought in federal court. This so called “federal standing doctrine” imposes three limitations on
prospective plaintiffs. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact - an invasion of a

themselves will likely see competitors seeking invalidation, 96 or, more likely, their competitors
will simply begin to practice the claimed inventions, thus leaving the inventors in the unenviable
position of deciding whether to initiate an infringement suit. However, given the cost and timeconsuming nature of patent litigation, patent holders are more likely not to file suit over now
questionable claims.
On the other side, there are likely many patents that contain broad claims that encompass
both unpatentable material (isolated DNA), as well as patent eligible material (cDNA). Going
forward these will be the most interesting cases. Patentees will most likely choose to take
proactive steps to shore up their patent coverage by applying for reissuance of the patent. 35
U.S.C. § 251 governs the reissue of patents and outlines the rules USPTO will follow when
deciding whether or not to grant a reissued patent. Section 251 provides that the USPTO may
reissue a patent, upon surrender of the original patent, if the patent is “through error, 97 deemed

legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of-the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision. If a plaintiff fails to satisfy any of these requirements, they
cannot sue in federal court. In the patent context, that means they cannot challenge the validity of
a patent. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329,
1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh'g denied (Sept. 13, 2011), reh'g denied (Sept. 16, 2011), cert.
granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App'x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012). It
is likely that a licensee will have little trouble meeting this burden; however, this may be more
relevant to patentee’s competitors discussed infra.
96
Competitors may have more trouble initially meeting the limitations of the federal standing
doctrine, but the inclusion of the word imminent threat of invasion of a legally protected interest
will likely get many would be plaintiffs into court. See supra note 74.
97
Ball Corp. v. United States, 729 F.2d 1429, 1435-36 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding, for reissue
purposes, that “error is established where there is no evidence that the appellant intentionally
omitted or abandoned the claimed subject matter”).

wholly or partly inoperative or invalid.” 98 Section 251 is remedial in nature, based on
“fundamental principles of equity and fairness, and should be construed liberally;” nonetheless,
“not every event or circumstance that might be labeled ‘error’ is correctable by reissue.” 99
Patentees with claims that are now overly broad fall into this reissue category and may be
allowed, within limitations, to amend their claims to remove the patent-ineligible material while
retaining the patentable subject matter. 100
Section 251 limits the subject matter of the amended claims to subject matter that was in
the original patent stating: “no new matter shall be introduced into the application for reissue.”101
Careful claim drafting, designed to give the maximum coverage possible under the new
guidelines, is where the need for an excellent patent lawyer comes into play. Introduction of new
matter does not mean that the substitute claim can only contain the same subject matter as the
original. Instead, it means that it cannot contain subject matter that was not included in the
original claims and/or specifications. 102 Therefore, taking into account the broad nature of patent
specifications, a good patent drafter may be able to retain much of the originally covered
material by crafting claims utilizing the original specifications and subject matter that the Court
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did not exclude from patentability, i.e. chemical compositions of the isolated DNA sequence, 103
emphasizing the importance the claimed cDNA, 104 claiming the methods of isolation, 105 or, if
applicable, claiming the DNA in an altered state. 106
While this decision might affect those holding one of the estimated 40,000 genetic
material patents, it will certainly impact those who hold one of the almost 3,000 which are
specifically directed to isolated DNA molecules. 107 The effects may be minimized by clear,
unbiased, and unvarnished assessment of the continued utility of existing patents. If they are
worth saving, a well thought out, and progressive looking plan of action to recapture as much
protection as possible will be necessary.
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Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2118 (2013).
Justice Thomas intimated that, had Myriad’s claims been expressed in terms of chemical
composition, they may have survived the product-of-nature exclusion. “Myriad's claims are
simply not expressed in terms of chemical composition, nor do they rely in any way on the
chemical changes that result from the isolation of a particular section of DNA.” Id.
104
Id. at 2119 (“cDNA is not a ‘product of nature’ and is patent eligible under § 101, except
insofar as very short series of DNA may have no intervening introns to remove when creating
cDNA.”)
105
Id. (“[T]here are no method claims before this Court. Had Myriad created an innovative
method of manipulating genes while searching for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, it could
possibly have sought a method patent.”)
106
Id. at 2120 (holding that DNA may be patentable if “the order of the naturally occurring
nucleotides has been altered. Scientific alteration of the genetic code presents a different inquiry,
and we express no opinion about the application of § 101 to such endeavors.”)
107
See Rogers, supra note 29, at 19, 40; see also Richard Wolf, Justices Rule Human Genes
Cannot Be Patented, USA TODAY, (Jun. 13, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2013/06/13/supreme-court-gene-breast-ovarian-cancer-patent/2382053/ (“Since 1984, the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office has granted more than 40,000 patents tied to genetic material.”);
see also Randolph V. Clower, Impending Myriad Decision Portends Promethean Consequences
for Biotech Industry, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Mar. 2013, at 9.

B. Patent Applications in their Various Stages and Inventors Anticipating Patent
Applications
Existing patent applications and inventors who are in various stages of Research and
Development (R&D) anticipating application for patent protection will take a similar approach,
albeit through a different route. Pending applications will need to be amended to remove patentineligible subject matter, while future applications will need to be crafted to avoid their
inclusion. However, those with current applications pending will first need to decide if they wish
to continue the current prosecution, in which they will not be allowed to include new subject
matter in claim amendment; 108 or, to withdraw the application, regroup, and reassess their plan
of attack.
C. Continued Patentability of Gene Isolation Methods
It is important to note that this decision does not affect the patentability of the methods
utilized to isolate the DNA. 109 Statute defines claimed inventions that fall into the process
category as: a “process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine
manufacture, composition of matter, or material.” 110 The Supreme Court further explained:
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35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2012) (“Whenever, on examination, any claim for a patent is rejected, or
any objection or requirement made, the Director shall notify the applicant thereof, stating the
reasons for such rejection, or objection or requirement, together with such information and
references as may be useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of his
application; and if after receiving such notice, the applicant persists in his claim for a patent, with
or without amendment, the application shall be reexamined. No amendment shall introduce new
matter into the disclosure of the invention.”).
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110
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A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It
is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed
and reduced to a different state or thing. If new and useful, it is just as patentable
as is a piece of machinery. In the language of the patent law, it is an art. The
machinery pointed out as suitable to perform the process may or may not be new
or patentable; whilst the process itself may be altogether new, and produce an
entirely new result. The process requires that certain things should be done with
certain substances, and in a certain order; but the tools to be used in doing this
may be of secondary consequence. 111
Thus, the Court left the door open to patent the methods or processes used to isolate the DNA.
The reasoning behind this distinction once again returns to preemption. The patentability of the
method and/or process of isolation does not preclude others from using the isolated gene, it
simply limits the way in which they can accomplish the isolation of the desired gene. In light of
this distinction, the methods for isolating the DNA and, more importantly, new applications of
knowledge gleaned from the information obtained from the genetic sequences, remain patenteligible.
D. Overall Effect on Innovation and Industry
The decision, while far reaching in its implication, may not have the chilling effect that
many in the legal profession predicted. 112 Biomedical researchers, especially those at universities
and government funded facilities, report that intellectual property concerns have very little, if
any, impact on their research. 113 In a 2003 survey, Walsh et al. found that of the participants in

111

Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182-83 (1981) (internal quotations omitted).
See Dalila Argaez Wendlandt & James F. Haley, Jr., Supreme Court Rules That Isolated
Human Gene Is Not Patent Eligible in AMP v. Myriad, ROPES & GRAY ALERT (Jun. 14, 2013),
http://www.ropesgray.com/news-and-insights/Insights/2013/06/~/media/Files/alerts/2013/06/20
130614_IP_Alert.ashx; see also Clower, supra note 106, at 9.
113
John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Working Through the Patent Problem,
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the study “almost none of [the] respondents reported worthwhile projects being stopped because
of issues of access to IP rights to research tools.” 114 This seems to be in large part because
researchers choose to ignore patents, making infringement common. 115 When those who had
knowingly infringed a patent were asked why they chose to ignore the patentee’s rights most
“justified such infringement by invoking a research exemption.” 116
On the other hand, human genetics researchers, for whom gene patents are obviously
particularly relevant, will likely be the ones most impacted by the decision. Unlike the
biomedical researchers in the Walsh et al. surveys, a survey by Cho et al. of U.S. clinical
genetics laboratories indicated that 65% had received notification of potential infringement. 117

respondents (and all nine university or government lab respondents) acknowledged occasionally
using patented research tools without a license.”)
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. (Internal quotations omitted). This study was largely completed before the Madey v. Duke
decision in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that educational
institutions were not automatically exempt from infringement suits because they are not-forprofit, or the use of the patented material had no commercial application. 307 F.3d 1351, 1362
(Fed. Cir. 2002). Instead, they clarified previous holdings by specifying that a courts focus
should be “on the legitimate business [the accused infringer] is involved in and whether or not
the use [of the patented technology] was solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for
strictly philosophical inquiry.” Id. In response to this holding, Walsh et al. conducted another,
similar study in 2005 to determine the impact of the decision on researchers’ practices.
Interestingly, the holding, while most were aware of it, had little impact on a similar set of
subjects. Only 2% (i.e., eight) of the participants report having begun checking for patents in the
two years since Madey v. Duke, which suggests little impact of the decision. Five percent had
been made aware of intellectual property (IP) relevant to their research through a notification
letter sent either to them or their institution, which differs little from the 3% who reported having
received such notification five years ago (prior to the Madey v. Duke decision). Furthermore,
although 22% of respondents report being notified by their institutions to respect patent rights
(versus 15% in the earlier study), such notification did not appreciably affect the likelihood of
checking for patents - 5.9% of those receiving such instruction checked for patents versus 4.5%
of those not receiving instruction. John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho & Wesley M. Cohen, View from
the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002, 2002-03 (Sept. 29, 2005).
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These are the labs that conduct important research to develop clinical tests. The Cho et al. study
found that 25% of those labs had discontinued a test and 53% decided not to conduct research to
develop a test because of the threat of patent litigation. Further, 67% felt that patents inhibited
their ability to conduct genetic research and 85% indicated that patents resulted in less sharing of
information among researchers. 118 Similarly, an opinion poll conducted by Dr. Isaac Rabino, a
professor of Biological and Health Sciences at Empire State College, of the members of the
American Society of Human Genetics, revealed that 49% of respondents reported that patents
delayed or limited their research. 119 To the extent that such research was inhibited by the
existence of a patent on a DNA sequence, the removal of that barrier could prove significant.
So with the door open and researchers ready to innovate, the burning question becomes
whether anyone will pay to keep the lights on, the equipment working, and oh yes,, the
researchers paid? In a perfect world, we wouldn’t have to worry about the cost of research. Ideas
could be developed to their fullest potential, free from monetary and time constraints, and ideas
would be shared by all people who would collaborate freely. Alas, this Utopian vision does not
exist and innovators cannot live on ideas alone. So where is the money coming from, and will it
continue without the promise of patent protection?
Researchers are likely to be funded by a mix of grants from various government agencies,
institutions, and foundations. For example, a 2007 study of the movement of carbon in the ocean
was funded by the National Science Foundation, the U.S. Department of Energy, the Australian
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Cooperative Research Centre, and the Australian Antarctic Division. 120 Other research is funded
by private companies who generally finance research projects or studies related to their field.
This type of finding is prevalent is some fields, especially medicine. In the U.S., almost 75% of
clinical trials in medicine are paid for by private companies. 121
V. cDNA Is Patent-Eligible! But Is It Patentable?
An overly simplified description of the difference between naturally occurring DNA and
cDNA is that DNA contains the instructions for building every protein the body utilizes, 122 as
well as many unused (non-coding), 123 or inactive segments. 124 Synthetic DNA (aka cDNA), is
made in a lab by transcribing mRNA (which is an inverse copy of the original DNA), into a
complementary form (an inverse copy of the mRNA), which contains the same essential code as
its naturally occurring compliment (DNA) with the unused segments excluded. 125
So what makes the cDNA patent-eligible? The answer is: the hands of man! In 1799,
Chief Justice Lord Kenyon penned the infamous gold-standard for determining the threshold
question of patentability, “I have no doubt in saying, that this is a patent for a manufacture,
which I understand to be something made by the hands of man.” 126 A similar sentiment, quoted
with approval by the Supreme Court in Chakrabarty and often preached as the will of Congress,
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that patentable subject matter should “‘include anything under the sun that is made by man.’”127
And once again in this case, the Supreme Court dismissed the naturally occurring nucleotide
sequence necessary to make the invention useful, 128 finding instead that “the lab technician
unquestionably creates something new when cDNA is made.” 129
The continued patent-eligibility of cDNA has been hailed by many as a win for the
biotech industry. 130 The reason most often cited being that commercially, cDNA may be the
most important form of DNA used. 131 While this may be true, this is a truly shortsighted view.
Just because cDNA meets the threshold requirements of § 101, does not mean that it is
patentable, or that existing patents will withstand an invalidity action. The Court merely held that
cDNA is eligible to walk through the door; it must still survive the gauntlet that awaits once
inside.
To highlight this point, let’s take a hypothetical cDNA molecule. The Court points out
that cDNA does not contain introns like the naturally occurring DNA it compliments,
incidentally one of the reasons they held it is not a “product of nature.” 132 mRNA is a more
useful predictor of a polypeptide sequence than DNA because the introns have been spliced out,
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however, it is not as stable because it’s single stranded structure make it more prone to undesired
chemical reactions. Enter cDNA, an inverse, double stranded copy of the mRNA that is more
stable. 133
This is all sounding very exciting if I am a researcher. I found the gene I want to study, I
identified the mRNA transcript and now I can make cDNA. I know I can’t get patent protection
for all the work I put into discovering the gene sequence, but the Supreme Court did say that I
could patent the more useful cDNA. Awesome, where is the patent application? But, and there is
a big but, isn’t it logical to remove the non-coding portions? They don’t do anything anyway.
How about making more stable copies of a useful molecule; that sounds obvious too, right?
Therein lies the problem. Compliments of naturally occurring DNA are not novel, nor are they
non-obvious. If you want to work with most genes, then cDNA is going to be one of the obvious
tools you use. So even though the very useful tool you just created has been called patent-eligible
by the Supreme Court, the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art is going to keep you
from reaching the end of the gauntlet, and your discovery remains unpatentable.
Obviously this was a rather ridiculous, and probably not very realistic scenario, but it
does serve to highlight the problem with all the rhetoric and misinformation. The Supreme Court
did not hold that you will get a patent for the cDNA you created, or the DNA you described as a
chemical compound instead of the natural sequence, or the methods you used to discover such.
The Court only addressed the question of whether or not they were patent-eligible material. To
actually be patented, the invention must meet the other requirements of Title 35 as well.
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VI. Conclusion
Where does this decision leave the patenting community? Unfortunately, lamenting as
Paul, “[f]or now we see through a glass, darkly.” 134 The decision, despite all the buildup, has
given the inventing community few answers, and perhaps even more questions. Perhaps Myriad
summed it up best in a post on their Facebook page saying the case was about more than patent
claims: “It was about human health, and innovation to make sure that cancer tests are accessible
and affordable to women who need them.” 135
The good news is the Court has defined the § 101 threshold inquiry, and decided that the
hands of man must be clearly seen in an invention before the inventor may cross it. However, the
Court has left inventors wondering: once an invention is eligible to cross the threshold, will §§
102, 103, and 112 be hiding behind the door waiting to slam it in their faces? As Myriad argued
in their brief opposing certiorari, “the relevance of patenting isolated human DNA is ever
diminishing in light of the publication of the entire human genome in 2001 . . . , thus presenting
arguable bars to patentability under other provisions of the Patent Act (such as obviousness
under § 103) for any claims to isolated human DNA molecules sought after that date.” 136 This
same argument will undoubtedly now be applied to cDNA. When the entire genome is mapped,
and the methods and technology needed to produce complimentary versions are commonplace,
where is the novelty? Further, is it not obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
produce these complimentary versions that are easier to work with? Only time will tell how the
USPTO and the courts will handle these questions.
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